|
|
|
El reino de la doble
moral,por Carmelo Mesa-Lago
Articulos Prensa Internacional
|
En esta entrega:
CONSIDERACIONES GENERALES 1. Como se aproxima su tercer aniversario, es oportuno reiterar nuestro compromiso con los otros partidos que integran la Plataforma Democrática Cubana y, más importante aún, con los principios que la inspiraron y que la siguen alentando. 2. En su esencia fundamental, el propósito suscrito por los firmantes de la Declaración de Madrid del 14 de Agosto de 1990 sigue vigente. Vale la pena seguir luchando por propiciar las circunstancias para un cambio político pacífico gradual a través de negociaciones y mecanismos electorales en Cuba. 3. La tesis de echar esto a andar a través de una negociación sigue siendo válida. Sin embargo, a pesar de que, objetivamente, su difícil situación pareciera obligar al gobierno cubano a asumir una postura más razonable, este sigue renuente a sentarse a negociar con la oposición. Sigamos insistiendo. 4. Dada su visibilidad y su legitimidad internacional, la estrategia de la Plataforma de "desamericanizar" el tema cubano en todo lo posible, e internacionalizar y multilateralizar su solución, sigue siendo legítima pero, por si sola, no resulta eficaz. Tenemos que estrechar nuestra colaboración con personas afines en la comunidad cubana en Estados Unidos y no abandonar por completo este importante terreno.
LO PARADOJICO DEL MOMENTO ACTUAL EN CUBA 1. Sin lugar a duda, el régimen revolucionario confronta la crisis más seria de toda su historia. 2. A primera vista, tanto desde una perspectiva histórica comparada, como de una lógica estructuralista, el régimen atraviesa circunstancias que debierían haber provocado su colapso. Dichas circunstancias incluyen: pérdida del referente ideológico, pérdida de su inserción en la economía política internacional, economía doméstica de sobrevivencia, ruptura del contrato social revolucionario, descontinuidad en su legitimidad de origen para las nuevas generaciones, falta de consenso entre la élite política, casi completa incertidumbre sobre el futuro y desaparición de su patrono internacional. 3. Pero surge una paradoja. A pesar de todo esto, dicho régimen (1) no ha perdido su capacidad represiva, (2) su dirigencia no ha perdido su voluntad de poder, y (3) no se han podido actualizar, a nivel de la realidad cotidiana cubana, los medios y la oportunidad de darle vigencia un proyecto alternativo convincente. En clave abreviada, la profunda crisis nacional que confronta el país no parece haber tenido consecuencias políticas de igual magnitud. 4. Es posible esbozar una serie de factores que ayudan a esta desproporción entre la crisis contextual del régimen y las consecuencias políticas de dicha crisis, incluyendo: (a) una estructura estalinista que borra los muy precarios espacios políticos que se han ido abriendo y que sofoca cualquier intento de resuscitar la sociedad civil; (b) una legitimidad residual de la que todavía disfruta y que le permite mobilizar a sus más decididos partidarios; (c) falta de alternativas (interlocutores, proyectos, organizaciones) políticas claras; (d) temor al revanchismo; (e) una preferencia por el escapismo a nivel individual (literalmente escapar del infierno, continuar el disimulo, resolver como uno pueda); (f) una incapacidad por ocuparse de otra cosa que no sea la sobrevivencia diaria; (g) una demostrada voluntad oficial de utilizar el nivel de represión que sea necesario; y (h) preocupación porque se repitan en Cuba las experiencias del post-totalitarismo de las sociedadades de la antigua Unión Soviética y del Centro de Europa. 5. Es también posible detallar algunas nuevas modalidades que sugieren que la crisis ha tenido consecuencias políticas, incluyendo: (a) la incapacidad de la dirigencia máxima de controlar completamente al Partido Comunista de Cuba, tanto en sus procesos eleccionarios, como en las deliberaciones de sus dos últimos congresos; (b) las votaciones negativas registradas el 20 de Diciembre de 1992 y el 24 de Febrero de 1993; (c) una actitud más abiertamente critica por parte de la ciudadanía; (d) una incipiente ola de protesta popular y de desobediencia civil. 6. Pero por el momento, ni desde "arriba", comenzando dentro del PCC y derramándose al nivel de los cubanos comunes y corrientes, ni desde "abajo", como corriente que aglutine y masifique a muchos de éstos, ha habido un reto decisivo al régimen que le haya forzado a incluir una fuerte y elevada dosis de represión en su actual política de re-equilibramiento. Esto no quiere decir que no lo haya sino, simplemente, que no se puede contar con este factor por el momento.
CONSECUENCIAS DE LA PARADOJA 1. Al no verse retado desde abajo y al mantener a raya a cualquier disidencia interna, dentro del PCC, el oficialismo no se cree obligado a negociar el cambio político. No admite estar confrontando una seria crisis política. 2. El oficialismo ha elaborado una estratregia de re- equilibrio basada en mantener desconectados lo político y lo económico, un poco a la usanza de la estrategia llevada a cabo por la gerontocracia que regentea la República Popular China, pero con rasgos eminentemente propios y enteramente encuadrados en el comportamiento clásico del régimen en materia de política económica. Esto incluye la improvisación, la hypercentralización y los planes descabellados. 3. El oficialismo está convencido de que, a través del "trabajo político", puede mantener separados los dos circuitos, ganar tiempo, aprovecharse de una coyuntura más favorable, ir introduciendo cambios económicos con ayuda extranjera e ir cambiando la estructura política a su propio ritmo y sin perder el control. A pesar de que los magros cambios que se han llevado a cabo en lo económico-- francamente no hemos podido detectar concesión alguna en lo político --tienen la intención de salvar la continuidad de la dirigencia, inclusive dentro de un régimen distinto, el alcance de dichos cambios no es completamente previsible ni controlable por parte del gobierno cubano. Es además evidente que dicho cambio económicos no van a "cuadrar la caja", no van a resolver la inmensa crisis económica cubana. Las consecuencias de esto no son diferibles al antojo del régimen. 4. Al no sentirse fuertemente presionado desde adentro y sin una completa prostración económica, el régimen no se ve obligado a negociar con la oposición cubana. Pretende aprovechar la presidencia de alguien a quien percibe como un clásico demócrata liberal para librarse del embargo y así zanjar el diferendo histórico entre la Cuba revolucionaria y los Estados Unidos. 5. La administración Clinton no tiene nada de pro-castrista. No le interesa subsidiar un régimen económicamente irresponsable y políticamente oprobioso. Estima que los vectores de cambio están activos en Cuba, pero que no ha transcurrido tiempo suficiente para que éstos afecten al régimen. No hay nada que negociar con Castro, pues a él corresponde hacer una oferta sensata. El tiempo lo obligará a cambiar su actitud. 6. Es preciso aclarar que apoyamos el derecho del pueblo a protestar, que consideraremos enemigo a cualquiera que reprima violentamente ese derecho y que, a nuestro entender, el régimen tiene dos opciones: negociar ahora o ahogarse mañana en un baño de sangre. Nos hemos impuesto la obligación moral de negociar con enemigos. Pero no somos magos. No estamos obligados ni capacitados para salvarlos de su egoísmo y de su soberbia. 7. Nada de esto hace realmente más difícil la agenda de la Plataforma Democrática Cubana, tampoco la deslegitimiza.
NUESTRA VISION: NI ABULIA NI PALOS DE CIEGO 1. Sustentados por lo expuesto anteriomente y ausente una contingencia severa asumimos que: (a) las posibilidades de un levantamiento, ya sea del embargo norteamericano como del pueblo cubano, son igualmente remotas en el futuro inmediato; (b) Fidel Castro tratará de mantener la estrategia vigente a lo que de lugar-- se aunan aquí su soberbia y su autosuficiencia con una profunda preocupación por su sobrevivencia física y su vigencia histórica; (c) no será posible mantener vínculos orgánicos estables y funcionales con las más de 100 organizaciones de disidentes en Cuba; (d) será necesario pero no suficiente el continuar nuestro activismo internacional; (e) habrá que dedicar mucho más esfuerzos y recursos a penetrar directamente la realidad cubana y a hacernos visibles y relevantes en ella; (f) tendremos que calibrar cuidadosamente cómo sumarnos a esfuerzos llevados a cabo por otras organizaciones cubanas sin duplicarlos; (g) tendremos que discutir más a fondo cómo podríamos aprovechar los cambios aprobados por el oficialismo para que estos redunden en beneficio a la democratización.
Documento presentado originalmente en la reunión de consulta de la Plataforma Democrática Cubana del 8 de Junio de 1993, Miami, Florida.
Editorial:
Riddles of Interdependence. Nine previous administrations have sought to address the concerns of Cuban Americans while testing and implementing policies they thought could promote genuinely democratic change in Cuba. Every new administration has heard arguments about why hardline policies, such as the Reagan-Bush "pressure cooker" approach, or, alternatively, the "constructive engagement" approach proffered by liberal internationalists like Jimmy Carter, was the politically correct thing to do. In all fairness, if regime change in Cuba were a measure of their actual effectiveness, neither approach passed the ultimate test of efficacy. Where does this leave us? One answer is that regime change in Cuba is, and cannot be conceived of as anything but, a primarily Cuban, and not a United States, responsibility. The second is that, as Senator Bob Graham (D-Fla.) remarked recently, the United States should not repeat the mistakes of the last hundred years in Cuba. We read our Senator's statement as renouncing the temptation to play a protagonic role in domestic Cuban politics. But what is domestic Cuban politics? Here is where the problem gets complicated. Although Cuba is not currently a top priority in U.S. foreign policy, the Clinton administration will, in the best of cases, be compelled to articulate a rationale for reconciling domestic and foreign aspects of the Cuba problem and, at worst, may have to respond to a crisis-- including a massive influx of genuine political refugees trying to escape violent conflict in Cuba. Whichever the case down there, demands for a clearly-articulated Cuba policy will continue over here because Cuba is an "intermestic" issue in U.S. politics. By this is meant that it is difficult to separate the inter(national) from the (do)mestic aspects of Cuban-American politics. Intermestic issues do not inexorably arise from geographic proximity. Typically, intermestic issues tend to muddy the waters, producing unsuspected alignments and coalition partners, and casting doubt on the actual national status of participants. For example, sugar trade was the most salient intermestic issue in the traditional bilateral relations between Cuba and the United States until the eve of the revolution. U.S. refiners and industrial users had a vested interest in a large quota of (cheap) Cuban sugar vis-à-vis domestically produced but more expensive, subsized U.S. sugar. There were Americans and Cubans on both sides of the issues. Sometimes intermestic issues arouse the concern of very broad segments of society, as in the case of the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), involving many diverse interests and regions of the country. In such cases, the forces on different sides of the issue may be evenly balanced. In others, they engage the interests and energies of a much narrower spectrum of society and opinion is overwhelmingly in favor of one option-- aid to Israel, continued hostility to the government of Fidel Castro. The roughly ten percent of Cubans who live in to the United States is not even a mole in the American demographic mass. Demographics alone cannot have possibly account for U.S.-Cuban intermesticism. But the Cubans have settled primarily in Florida and New Jersey, two states that count for approximately ten percent of the Electoral College votes required to elect the president of the United States. Within Florida, Cubans have concentrated in Dade and Broward counties, affluent and based on service-oriented economies, and wielding considerable influence in politics. Until their retirement in 1992, two of the most powerful members of the United States House of Representatives, Dante Fascell and Larry Smith, were elected from districts in those counties. Within Dade, Cubans are a majority in some of the larger of its twenty-seven municipalities and have gained a very firm foothold on the recently reorganized County Commission. What does this mean in everyday politics? To borrow a phrase from a former speaker of the House, "Tip" O'Neill, what this means is that "everything is local politics." Intermesticism is not imperialism. It has little to do with anybody's burden nor with supposedly civilizing missions; it has little to do with battleships nor with shipping Bibles overseas. Intermesticism was not exhausted by the end of the Cold War nor by the worldwide collapse of Leninism. It remains rooted in the fact that, regardless ideological and political referents, some specific forms of interdependence are here to stay. This one may hate, love or be indifferent to but it remains a fact. In a nutshell, despite its objectively low priority on the larger order of things, this administration can ill afford, first, for its crisis potential, and, second, for its intermestic nature, to ignore "the Cuba thing" altogether. The Ghosts of Legacies Past. In view of the broad principles he enunciated in his Milwaukee and Raleigh speeches during the 1992 presidential campaign, Bill Clinton's interpretation of the liberal-interventionist legacy of the Democratic Party seems to embrace: a principled defense of human rights, a prudent promotion of democracy abroad, and a sharing in the benefits of free and fair trade practices. A statement by assistant secretary of state Clifton Wharton to the Council of the Americas confirmed this. In what was billed as the first major pronouncement of the administration's Latin America policies, Mr. Wharton described the promotion of human rights as "the core of the administration's foreign policy." Concerning Cuba, Wharton's statement of policy objectives combined the hope for a peaceful transition from communism with a publicly-stated intention to not intervene militarily in Cuba. Fair enough. All these should have been good news for all Cuban democrats. But Cuban Americans have been at war with the Democratic Party for a long time. Should Mr. Clinton do phenomenally well in all these fronts, including Cuba, he may still not emerge with a majority of the Cuban American vote in 1996. It is very unlikely that the oldest cohort of Cuban immigrants, the true exiles, the ones who have never recovered and who survive by clinging to their memories, will vote Democratic under any circumstances. Did not Jack Kennedy abandon the 2506 Brigade in Playa Girón? Did he not lose his nerve in the Cuban Missile Crisis? Was Jimmy Carter not soft on communism? The middle-aged cohort, American Cubans who have been here for quite a while, may be more sophisticated but they vote their pocketbooks and, unless there is something in it for them, are not likely to swing to Clinton at all. Younger Cuban Americans will probably split more evenly, but they will not be dominant within the (older than average) Cuban-American community for some time. Whatever the accuracy of the memories their pain is very real and it might be best to leave the older Cubans alone. To be sure, Cuban radio (in Miami and from Havana) shall continue to manipulate and exploit their feelings, but it may be very difficult to reach and tell them otherwise. Respect their dignity and sorrow may be all we can do for them, at least for now. But there was a domestic side to the Kennedy cum Great Society agenda from which Cuban Americans benefited greatly, and which is a valid legacy from which to reclaim other Cubans to a democratic (lower case fully intended here) cause. Refugee resettlement, the Cuban version of the National Defense Educational Act, GI benefits for college tuition and mortgages, and loans from the Small Business Administration have helped create a broad middle class that is the backbone of our community. They must be reminded that a combination of very hard effort on their part and government policies that improved their opportunities jointly contributed to their individual success. Today this middle class is greatly concerned with the future of its children and grandchildren; with their access to higher education, quality jobs after graduation, social mobility, and affordable quality housing and health care. This class understands and can relate to the concerns expressed by the Clinton campaign in 1992 and to many of the policy initiatives proposed by the administration. We see fruitful possibilities for a reconciliation between Cubans and Democrats at this time, without having to revisit false promises and having to afford the consequences that such promises would likely provoke. A Frank Appraisal. We know four things about Cuba. One is that, at present, the Castro regime shows no sign of immediate breakdown-- this despite the worst crisis in Cuban history. Two, the people who have means and opportunity to force Mr. Castro to engage in real changes and/or drive him out of office live in Cuba, not in the United States. In his arrogance, Mr. Castro may be underestimating the degree of exasperation of the Cuban elite and people. He will be the first to know different but no one can accurately and responsibly predict when. Three, U.S. policies that have allowed Mr. Castro to play up the imperialism-versus- nationalism theme have not advanced democracy in Cuba; those emphasizing the contradiction between democracy and dictatorship have made him miserable. Unfortunately, there has been too much of the former. Fourth, the most effective strategies for change in Cuba may not always be the most popular but artful dodging will not please anyone. Who else except people who are now in Cuba could possibly initiate and lead a process of transition to democracy? Should a sudden burst of realism hit Mr. Castro and make him understand that he has no option except to negotiate, should we turn our backs on his overtures? Do we need his good faith and credit or just his realization that his choices are very reduced to launch a negotiation? Who is more likely to not get what he wants? Some Proposals for the Short Term: Cuba. There is a constituency in Cuban Miami which is neither radical nor disengaged from Cuban affairs. These are people who look forward to contributing their time, talent and treasure to the reconstruction of Cuba, even though it is unlikely that most of them shall resettle there. They have been waiting for Cuba policies rooted in the realm of the possible and truly aimed at promoting democracy and prosperity in their homeland. Interpreting the sentiments and aspiration of this constituency, we ask the administration to evolve a Cuba policy rooted in six principles: (a) recognition that only Cubans can democratize their country, (b) willingness to support efforts to negotiate a gradual, peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba, (c) no offensive military actions to help bring this about, (d) systematic denunciation of abuses of human rights in Cuba, (e) no normalization of diplomatic relations without a previous negotiation between the Cuban government and its opposition, and (f) no comprehensive changes in economic and trade trade relations unless a genuine and irreversible democratization is taking place in Cuba. We anticipate that, in order to faithfully execute the laws of the United States, Mr. Clinton is going to enforce the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992. But it will be helpful to long-term United States and Cuban interests, (1) to notify concerned governments that the United States will not subordinate its bilateral relations with them to some of the provisions of the Act, (2) to clarify that it does not interpret the Act as a new Platt Amendment since it does not intend to allow any one group to monopolize the evaluation of whether democratic changes are afoot in Cuba, and (3) that it will do its best, within the law, to facilitate the delivery of food and medicine to the Cuban people, and ease up restrictions in travel and communication. Proposals for the Short Term: Cuban Americans. Cuban American politics in Dade County have constantly been contrasted with Cuban domestic politics. To be sure, intolerance, exclusionism, violence, and unreason have characterized Cuban politics in the last thirty years. It is small consolidation that, undoubtedly, Cubans in Miami have fared better. While the general climate in Miami has improved in recent years, we cannot continue with more of the same; it is inelegant to preach democracy to Cuba as long as intolerance reigns in Cuban Miami. No miracles will follow but the tone and tenor of Cuban American politics will improve if: ON LAW AND ORDER IN MIAMI, (a) the Justice Department, the Attorney General, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, and magistrates and attorneys in our federal district move to prosecute those responsible for unresolved acts of terrorism committed in Dade County; and if, (b) without fanfare, the federal government faithfully executes the Neutrality Act. ON IMMIGRATION, the administration (a) scrupulously adheres to the letter of the Immigration Agreement allowing for the orderly entry of up to twenty thousand Cubans per year; (b) notifies the Cuban government that any organized massive exodus to the U.S. shall be considered an act of aggression; and (c) supports the continuation of the Cuban Adjustment Act until there is a change of regime in Cuba. ON BROADCASTING TO CUBA, the administration (a) revamps the Board of Directors of TV and Radio Marti, so that this shall reflect the diversity of our opinions and prevent any group from monopolizing their activities; and (b) appoints a career civil servant of Cuban background and steeped in journalism to head the Office of Broadcasting to Cuba.
A Neo-Realist View by Enrique A. Baloyra Herp, PhD
Frames of Reference: Realism and Altruism. It is useful to begin the discussion of the scope and nature of United States policies toward Latin America in the 1990s with a retrospective look. Lest it be confused with other things, by realism I mean an orientation to foreign affairs which seeks to respond to how the world actually is, by giving primacy to the coherent use of state power in protecting national interest from the relative anarchy prevailing in international relations and from the selfish actions of others. On many occasions, theorists and practitioners have referred to this as realpolitik. Concerning international relations, as distinct from philosophy, realism has been primarily circumscribed to the ontological, not to the methodological or epistemological realms. It is important to conceptualize realism and its alternatives adequately so that false premises do not lead us to erroneous conclusions resulting in obfuscation and eventually conflict along surprisingly familiar lines. Proposing alternatives to realism implies asking, What is the essence of realism? Failure to address this question has often led to alternatives that do not imply its opposite. For example, pluralism and globalism have been presented as complementary to, while critical theory and interdependence are posited as more radical departures from, realism. In my view, any debate about the primacy of politics or economics does not takes us far afield. Critics who postulate the primacy of economics are not really challenging realism. All they are doing is offering their own version of realism. From the normative and epistemological standpoints, a more plausible alternative would not be post-modernism, as some have suggested, not entirely without (surrealist) humor I suppose, but altruism. By this I mean a basically emancipatory vision of what could or ought to be. Viewed from this perspective, a serious debate about realism implies asking whether or, better, in what circumstances people-- organized as nations, institutions, organizations or groups and individuals --act or can be made to act primarily on selfish or altruistic grounds. Translated into more practical concerns this also asks whether conflict or cooperation are the more efficient engines of innovation and improvement in international relations. In recent times, proponents of alternate approaches and critics have conflated realism with other things, such as imperialism and anti-Communism. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc has nurtured the assumption that we are entering an era in which increasing economic interdependence, and a multilateral approach to issues like the environment, drug trafficking, pandemic hunger, and ethnic conflict are harbingers of a kinder and gentler new world order. Conflict and Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere. Does the elimination of a major source of (East-West) conflict assure us a new era of (North-South) cooperation in the Western hemisphere? Does the fact that imperialism may have passed from the scene imply that United States foreign policy is now beyond the unenlightened influence of narrow domestic interests? Does the fact that the Cold war is over mean that the other American republics will no longer be unstable and that the United States will finally abandon the tradition of "strategic denial?" This tradition is very old, and runs through the No-Transfer Resolution of 1811, the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, the Spanish-American War of 1898, the Platt Amendment of 1901, the Roosevelt Corollary of 1904, the dollar diplomacy of Taft and Knox, Hughes' Caribbean Doctrine of 1923, the Clark Memorandum of 1928, the Rio Treaty of 1947, and the Reagan Doctrine of the 1980s. Cynics might include the Good Neighbor Policy, the Alliance for Progress, the Caribbean Basin Initiative and similarly "altruistic" policies. While strategic denial is not the only source of inspiration for United States policy in the Western hemisphere but has been the dominant influence. In the realm of U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America even the critics of realism, who are normally the proponents of multilateral or more global approaches to cooperation, give us pause for a very optimistic outlook. Those who want the United States to abandon the Gestalt of "strategic denial" have generally been pessimistic about what the United States can really contribute to the democratization of the hemisphere. Others who are confident of a better future remain wary of the United States' penchant for periodically getting caught in what Robert Pastor has aptly described as "whirlpools of crises." These weaknesses justify a prudent approach to foreign policy and international relations on the part of the United States. As has happened before, a desire to act altruistically may not find the means and opportunity to do so. Acknowledging this is neo-realism. From the standpoint of the design and practice of Latin American diplomacy, it would appear that, for the last one hundred and fifty years, the other American republics have opposed realism on moral, political, and ideological grounds. It would also appear that, ironically, the foreign policies of those other, weaker, American republics have been more effective when they have anticipated the realist impulses of the mighty. I would contend that some of the more celebrated doctrines in Latin American diplomacy, including the Calvo and Drago doctrines, emerged as direct responses to strategic denial and the Monroe doctrine. I would not hesitate to describe the foreign policies inspired by those doctrines as successful. That success resulted from defensive reactions to realism. The opposite view-- espousing altruistic interventionism --would be that of the Tobar (1907) and Betancourt (1960) doctrines, revitalized by an emerging consensus within the Organization of American States. But if there is a constant in the foreign policy thinking of the latinoamericanos, from the Calvo, Estrada and Drago doctrines all the way through the Contadora and Esquipulas agreements, this has been the use of diplomacy as a surrogate for defense policy. This was and is Latin neo-realism. To be sure, things have improved considerably in domestic Latin American politics. There is a new conviction that maintaining democracy is a collective responsibility. A new and fresh understanding of macroeconomic policy now characterizes the design and execution of fiscal and monetary policy in the region. Twenty-years ago, left and right parties were more concerned with preserving ideological correctness and doctrinal inflexibility thahn with balancing budgets and defending the currency. Now they are renovated and imbued with a pragmatic desire to do well. Elites and the attentive public are demanding personal integrity and accountability in government as natural extensions of official respect for human rights and for the rule of law. A new sophisticated understanding of how United States foreign policy is made has helped the other Americans gain a measure of influence and sense of efficacy vis-à-vis the Yankees. But problems remain. The end of the Cold War did very little to increase the control that Latin American producers have over the export prices of their traditional commodities and to make the markets of First World countries more permeable. Partly as a result of these, the Latin American economies remain very vulnerable to product and business cycles, not to mention protectionism in its different guises. While of late international monetary authorities have grown more understanding and have formulated loan conditionality with less draconian criteria, they remain formidably asymmetrical with respect to any Latin American government. The balance of bargaining power has not shifted much in this regard and foreign conditionality poses tough, destabilizing choices between macroeconomic adjustment and social peace to the Latin American democracies. Narco-trafficking has become a multinational enterprise and the very fabric of the state and many core social values are being threatened by the corrosive infuence of drug barons and their front men. Latin American governments will not be able to successfully address all the major irritants in their bilateral relations with the United States immediately and simultaneously. In addition, given the complexities surrounding the making of U.S. foreign policy, given the reality of divided government in the United States, and given the resilience of whirlpool effects, Latin American governments will do well in anticipating that they likely will get less than they expect from the United States. Where does this sober appraisal of Latin weaknesses leave us? Can we build a hemispheric community of democracies sustained by prosperity and free from military intervention? Could a neo- realist calculus of our weaknesses help us get there? Deriving New Strength From Acknowledged Weaknesses. I shall refrain from making specific policy recommendations, but I would be remiss if I did not address some of the more general problems. First, we need a new security regime. The Malvinas War drove the last nail into the coffin of a defense system predicated on Panamericanism and the Rio Treaty. It is difficult to accept that a new one should be predicated on a common defense against external enemies in a nuclear or conventional war. It is important that, given the greater likelihood of internal threats, the doctrines of foreign internal defense, low-intensity warfare, and counter-insurgency be reconciled and subordinated to the continuity of democratic institutionality. It is necessary that civilian elites in the rest of the hemisphere gain expertise and insight into military matters. Civilians should never again be excluded from the elaboration and fine-tuning of defense policies. They must take active part in all future programs of military assistance and national defense. Second, if trade is going to be an engine of economic growth we better gird ourselves for at least one decade of discussion and negotiation before a viable framework is in place. NAFTA could and should lead the way but, in order to be ratified, we may get a less comprehensive and satisfactory agreement than anticipated. We should not hang our heads if this happens; all concerned should grab what they can in this go around. One reason for being content with less than a full loaf is that NAFTA implies much more than adjusting and accommodating to very obvious realities. At a minimum NAFTA is a simple reckoning with an obvious reality: the tight economic interdependence between Mexico and the United States. NAFTA simply formalizes and legalizes existing arrangements. At a more complicated level NAFTA implies breaking up with ancestral taboos and prejudices that are part of the national myths of the countries of the northern half of this hemisphere. Third, concerning democratization, we can do considerably worse than allowing NGOs and multilateral organizations to play the more visible role in intermediating conflicts, monitoring elections and human rights, and helping solidify democratic institutions. This does not imply renouncing anything except the protagonism of any one country and depriving dictators of the ability to hide behind the excuse of nationalism. If democratic is a regime in which the government cannot systematically violate human rights because of the restrain of autonomous intermediary institutions, we may pursue democratization by defending human rights and/or promoting democratic institutions. Finally, we should realize that all of these goals are interdependent. The 1991 Democratic Consensus of Santiago addresses this very well. Each country may be sovereign to advance on these fronts at its own pace but, in order to join in and share in a hemispheric democrati community, all candidates must meet minimum requirements. No exceptions should be made. We should not try to take shortcuts with more embargoes. We should leave desperate measures to dictators and, as democrats, be prepared to advance with the optimism of the will tempered by the pessimism of the intellect. ENRIQUE A. BALOYRA es vicepresidente de la Coordinadora Social Demócrata de Cuba. En su versión inicial este trabajo fue leído en: "U.S.-Latin America Foreign Policy: New Approaches, New Perspectives," 1993 Annual Conference of the NALEO Educational Fund, Las Vegas, Nv., 24-26 Junio 1993.
|
|
|
|
¡
